ARMR PROTOCOL
Anonymous Routing Protocol with Multiple hops for Communications
in Highly Dynamic Hetrogenious Networks
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Vikram Neerugatti1
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A.Sreekanth Reddy2
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M.Tech CSE
II Year
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Assistant Professor, Dept of CSE
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Global College of engineering and Technology,
Kadapa
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Global College of engineering and Technology,
Kadapa
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Mail Id : vikram.nandu143 @ gmail.com
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Mail Id : askr86 @ gmail.com
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Abstract
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
are increasingly adopted in both military and civilian usesdue to its self
configuration and self-maintenance capabilities. MANETs are higly vulnerable to
security threats due to inherent charateristics as wireless transmission , lack
of fixed infrastructure , dynamically changing topoly, etc. The broadcast
nature of the wireless medium makes MANETs susceptible to various malicious
attacks. Traffics annalsis is one of the most serious security attacks in
MANETs. For instance , in a battle field the enemy can physically destroy the
important mobile nodes if they can identify and locate suck nodes by traffic
analysis . In order to thwat such attacks , ananymous communication protocols
are developed. For the purposes of security and robustness , an ideal anonymous
routing protocals as in the route, in particular , those of the source and the
destination. Multiple routes should be established to increase the difficulty
of traffic analysis and to avoid broken paths due to node mobility . Existing
schemes either make the unrealistic and undesired assumption that certain
topological information about the network is known to the nodes , or cannot
achieve all the properties described in
the above .
In the paper , we propose an
anonymous routing protocol with multiple routes called ARMR, which can satisfy
all the required properties. In addition, the protocal has the flexibility of
creating fake routes to confuse the adversaries , thus increasing the level of
anonmity. In the terms of communication efficiency , extensive simultion is
carried out. Compared with AODV and MASK , our ARMR protocol gives a higer
route request success rate under all situations and delay of our protocol is
comparable to the best of these two protocols.
Keywords – MANET, Secure Routing, Anonymous Routing, ARMA
Protocol, Traffic Anonymity, Data Anonymity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs)
consist of a collection of wireless mobile nodes to form a network that does
not need any pre-deployed infrastructure and routing packets are transmitted
only relying on the intermediate peers. One of the aims of MANETs is to turn
the dream of making users get connected at anytime and anywhere into true. Due
to the attractive characteristics of MANETs, many practical applications are
being designed including military and civilian scenarios. Typical application examples
include military battlefield operations, disaster rescue scenarios, and ad hoc
meetings, among others [1]. When planning mobile ad hoc networks, security is
indispensable because of the shared nature of wireless devices, the mobility of
the nodes and the limited transmission range.
Adhoc
means in Latin "formed for" or "concerned with one specific
purpose", nodes in Ad Hoc Networks are freedom to move, they may act as
both host and router, and each node can be trust traffic on anther nodes
maintaining connectivity in a decentralized manner. That's why Ad hoc Network
is also known as infrastructureless network, also nodes are self-forming and
self-configuring.[2], [3]. It has many characteristic that differentiate it
from other wireless network include: Dynamic deployment, Wireless medium less
dependable than wired medium, Limited Capacity and Bandwidth, Energy life in
mobile node power resources can be replaced by users, and the Security because
mobile nodes in the network its prone to many kind of attacks [4]. Routing
protocols for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks is very important to ensure deliver packet
to appropriate distantion it can be classified to: (i) Table Driven or
Proactive Protocols is updated every time the topology changes [5]. (ii) On
Demand or Reactive Protocols is obtaining to create a path to a destination
only when node in the network demands for it [6]. (iii) Hybrid Routing
Protocols in this type is mixed between the above types [4]. Although all these
routing protocols for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks without any protect from any type
of attack. We used Cryptography for improve security to AODV protocol.
Cryptography is an operative method of defensive sensitive information as it is
kept on media or transmitted through network communication routes. The main
reason for use cryptography for hide information from anyone unauthorized those
called attackers, if the attacker has enough time, desire, and resources the
algorithms can be destroyed and the information can be exposed [7]. Cryptography
can classified into two type: secret key is also known as symmetric
cryptography is single key used for both encryption and decryption but the
major difficulty with this method is the distribution of the key that it's
solved by the another type is public key (asymmetric) cryptograph public
cryptography [8].
The uniformly distributed keys in
encryption and decryption it’s the same between communication parties the
authentication can only be achieved for that reason public-key cryptography is
used to solve the problem of key agreement or distribution, this render public
key more suitable for MANETs. Nonetheless the Traditional public key
cryptography usually used when dependence on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
that means it has a Certificate Authority as principal control point that every
node in MANET must be trusted in this point. That is a big obstacle with the
MANET characteristics also this PKIs make MANETs is more overhead in storage
and packet transmission.
In the MANET, the DSR[16] and AODV[14]
are two principal on-demand routing protocols. However, they do not provide any
security and anonymity protection, which make them vulnerable to a variety of
security attacks. Up to now there have existed a number of valid and novel
MANET anonymous routing protocols [9-13]. We classified them into two types
based on their routing method. One is similar to the DSR routing protocol, the other
is similar to the AODV routing protocol. The idea of ANODR[9], ASR[10] and
MASK[11] is similar to AODV routing protocol which the intermediate node only
know the previous and next node information ,and the source and destination
node needn’t know the whole nodes en route. The overhead of packets forwarding
in these protocol don’t contain the whole route information. In the other side,
the idea of SDDR[13] and AnonDSR[12] is similar to DSR without optimization, in
which the source node store the route to the destination node and the nodes en
route don’t store the path information. The overhead of packets forwarding in
AnonDSR protocol contain the whole route information.
In[18],the author perfected the ANODR which
was firstly proposed in [9] and provided better solutions for route discovery,
data transfer and route maintenance. They also analyzed more comprehensively on
the anonymity and security properties. The advantage of ANODR is trapdoored boomerang
onion (TBO) used in route discovery which can protect the anonymity of node en
route and destination node.
The trapdoor thought is also accepted
by the later anonymous routing protocols. To reduce the public key
cryptographic computation, they advised the correspondence nodes exchange the
symmetric key in the first route discovery. Then, the source would use the
symmetric key in later route discovery processes toward the same destination
node. However, one limitation is that the public key algorithms have to be
processed in the RREP packets during route discovery. The other limitation of
the protocol is the symbol of RREP in REEP packet may leak the route information
due to its unicast mode.
MASK uses periodic hello messages to establish
pairwise trust relationship between neighborhood nodes when the nodes move to
the new place. Like ANODR, MASK employs an ondemand procedure to establish a
virtual circuit for later data delivery. The limitation of MASK is that it
provides conditional destination anonymity by utilizing and exposing the
destination’s identifier in ARREQs which it will benefit to get much better
routing efficiency. The MASK doesn’t introduce the trapdoor thought used in
ANODR.
AnonDSR and SDDR are anonymous
routing protocol based on the mix-net [15] layer-encryption thought and the DSR
protocol thought. They use layer encryption like onion in RREQ phase and each
node en route will use the temporal public key to encrypt their pseudonym and
symmetric key to encrypt the onion. As the destination node decrypts the
trapdoor, he will also decrypt the onion and get the intermediate node’s pseudonym
and corresponding symmetric key which won’t expose the intermediate nodes true
identity. After destination node return RREP to source node, the source and
destination nodes can communicate anonymously as the TOR[17]. To avoid running
the public key decryption on the trapdoor which will cost too much time and
power on mobile nodes, the AnonDSR introduces a security parameter establishment
(SPE) protocol to manage shared secrets between end-nodes and the global
trapdoor in RREQ is encrypted using symmetric cryptography. The one limitation
of AnonDSR is that it may leak the route information during AnonDSR’s SPE phase
because the route discovery in SPE phase is not encrypted and the route in SPE
phase may be similar to the route in the anonymous route discovery. The other
limitation is it doesn’t support the bi-directional link in the data
transferred phase.
In the paper , we
propose an anonymous routing protocol with multiple routes called ARMR, which
can satisfy all the required properties. In addition, the protocal has the
flexibility of creating fake routes to confuse the adversaries , thus increasing
the level of anonymity for
MANETs which can overcome the shortcomings of above anonymity routing protocol
and provide an efficient, security, strong anonymity, widely adaptability communication
protocol for the routing establishment and data forwarding.
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section II presents the related work. Section III presents our
anonymous targets and the network assumptions and attack models. Section IV describes
the essential idea of anonymous routing ARMR and the detail implementation of routing
protocol. We present Proof of Correctness in section V. Section VI presents
some concluding remarks in the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The limited resources of wireless
devices in MANETs requiring an efficient and reliable routing strategy become a
quite challenging issue. Papadimitratos and Hass have proposed a Secure Link
State Routing Protocol (SLSP) to secure the proactive topology discovery. The
nodes of SLSP maintain and disseminate the updated topological information within
their own zones in term of R hops. Smith et al. have presented a solution
to the security problems of distance-vector protocols that use two classes of
protection mechanism respectively for routing messages and routing updates.
Hu et al. present a Secure
Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD), which employs one-way
hash functions instead of asymmetric cryptographic encryption. Papadimitriou
and Haas also propose SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) based on DSR . The protocol
introduces an effectively secure query/reply mechanism to prevent the misbehaviour
of malicious nodes. Sanzgiri et al. propose the ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Ad
hoc Networks) protocol that makes use of cryptographic certificates to offer routing
security. Hu et al. provide a new
secure on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol (Ariadne), where routing messages
are authenticated to use different encryption approaches. Awerbuch et al. discuss the issue of byzantine failures and
propose an on-demand routing technique to detect a malicious link.
Secure routing in the Internet has
received increased attention, while secure routing for ad hoc networks is
important too. Some research has been developed for the anonymity for these
networks. Onion Routing protects the privacy of the sender, the receiver, message
content as a message is traversed to a network. SDAR proposed by Boukerche et al. is a novel secure distributed anonymous
routing protocol that uses onion routing to protect the anonymity and location
of communicating nodes and introduces trust management system to filter those
untrustworthy nodes. Kong et al. design Anonymous On-Demand Routing (ANODR)
which is based on a novel network security concept: “broadcast with trapdoor information”.
Zhang et al. design anonymous
on-demand routing protocol to authenticate the anonymous neighbourhood nodes
and establish the anonymous route discovery by pairing technique. Liu et al.
describe their trust management
scheme for trust-based multi-path routing, where honest nodes receive the
credit for good behavior; however, suspicious nodes will be penalized if they
supposedly lie about or exaggerate their contribution to routing.
MANETs was derivation through the
military, define by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) that
supported packet radio (PRNET) networks in 1970s, then still developing until
Ad Hoc Networks entered a new stage of growth due to the popularity and the
idea of an infrastructure less crew of mobile hosts was proposed, and its stall
to develop. Cryptography is used to provide security goals for Ad Hoc Network
because increase threats in network. Shamir was first proposed the idea of
Identity-based cryptography, he proposed it can be enables any pair of nodes to
communicate securely and to verify each other’s signatures without exchanging
private or public keys, by calculate public key through chooses his name and network
address, while secret key is computed by Private Key Generator which can be
privileged situation by knowing some secret information that enable it to
calculate the secret keys of all users in the network. After Shamir announced
his idea not developed quickly . Boneh and Franklin in 2001 proposed
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing. They offer a completely
practical Identity-Based Encryption scheme (IBE) and provide accurate
definitions for secure identity based encryption schemes. Adjih et al in 2005,
propose secure OLSR using IBC. Their suggestion TA is in charge of certifying or
assigning keys of each node joining in the trusted network. Each node sharing
the network will have the public key of the TA as global key; any node entering
the ad hoc network could deployment its public keys, with a specific key
exchange protocol, with proper parameters and signatures. Key that used later to
sign message is called the local key. A node would start creating OLSR control
messages, signing them using the local key with a specific addition which
prepends a special signature message.
The Routing protocols were presented
for ad hoc networks deal with changing deployment of mobility nodes. Secure
Routing protect against any threat on the network. The information that
transmitted between mobility nodes must be route by routing protocols this information
is the aim of many threats. There are two threat types on secure routing . One
came from outside the network called external by inserting, replaying, or distorting
information. Another threat came from inside network by compromised nodes,
which may it announce false information to other nodes to distinguish this information
is very difficult because vulnerable nodes are capable to create legal signatures
using their private keys . For protected from the first threat by using cryptographic
schemes for ensure security routing information, this way is not effective for
the second threat. But it not necessity to ignore this type ,the detection of compromised
nodes through routing information difficult in an ad hoc network as a result of
changing deployment. The routing protocol should be capable to discovery paths
that go around these vulnerable nodes. Routing protocols can discover multiple
directions for example protocols in DSR , AODV and ZRP , nodes that use these protocol
can change to an another route when the main route appears to have unsuccessful
.
III.
PRELIMINARIES
Anonymity
Goals
We classify into three anonymity goals proposed by as follows:
·
• Identity
anonymity: The source and destination node cannot
be identified by its neighbors. And it is computationally difficult for
adversaries to snoop and determine the node’s true identity. These nodes needed
protection include the sender nodes, recipient, nodes en route.
·
• Location
anonymity: Location Privacy consists of the following requirements: (a) No one node
knows the exact location of the source or the destination, except themselves;
(b) Other nodes, typically intermediate nodes en route, have no information
about their distance, i.e. the number of hops, from either the source or the destination.
·
• Route
anonymity: Route anonymity consists of the following requirements: (a) Adversaries,
either en route or out of the route, cannot trace a packet flow back to its
source or destination; (b) Adversaries out of the route have no information on
any node en the route.
Network
assumption and attack model
We
assume that all nodes are wishing to forward the packets according to the
protocol and have enough computational ability to process the algorithms in our
protocol.
We
assume that the adversaries have unbounded eavesdropping capability to
overwhelm any practical security protocol but bounded computing and node intrusion
capabilities
We assume that passive
adversaries can communicate with each other through private and fast communication
methods, either wireless or wired. They can collaborate with each other to
monitor every radio transmission on every communication link. In addition, they
may compromise any node in the target network to become an internal adversary.
IV. PROPOSED WORK
We propose ARMR routing protocol for MANET. It is inspired by a
combination of DSR, TOR, AODV, MASK, MASR and ANODR. We find that there exist
similar thoughts in DSR and TOR. For instance, the source node in these protocols
should know the whole route before data transferring. And the data packets also
should contain the route information overhead. The Onion Router (TOR) is the
culmination of many years of research by the Onion Routing project. To protect
the data and routing information, the proxy of source node constructs a multi-layer
encrypted data structure called an onion and sends it through the network. Each
layer of the onion defines the next hop in the route. The node en route that receives
an onion peels off the topmost layer, identifies the next hop, and sends the
remaining onion to the next router. From above analysis, we can utilize the DSR
protocol adaptability for unidirectional link, For layer encryption method and
the global trapdoor introduced by ANODR to construct our ARMR protocol.
Path Discovery Phase
The path discovery phase allows a
source node S to discover and establish a routing path through a number
of intermediate wireless nodes, in order to communicate with the destination node
R securely and privately. When the source node S triggers the
path discovery phase, the agent EDA associated with the destined node’s
ID and other information are included in the path discovery message that has three
parts. The first part is the open part, which indicates the message type, TYPE,
trust requirement, TRUST_VALUE, and a unique identifier for the message,
MESSAGE_ID. The second part contains the mobile agent EDA, and
the length PLS of the third part, padding. EDA includes IDR of
the intended receiver R, encrypted by EDA. Padding PS generated
by the source node S in the third part can hide real routing information
and protect against message size attack. When a node i receives a path
discovery message, it processes the message according to the steps as described
in Figure 1.
Creating
multiple routes with fake routes Phase
When the network is scalable or the
trust value required by the source node is not high, it is possible to discover
multiple different routes based on our current multicast routing strategy, so
the optimal path is helpful for the latter data transfer phase. Here, we
utilize the similar approach as the ARAN protocol: a non-congested,
non-shortest route will likely be preferred to a congested, shortest route .
This means that network congestion or network delay may lead that the first
reply to the source node from a route discovery request did not travel along
the shortest route. Therefore, ARMA does not seek a shortest path, but prefers
a quickest path. After the source node S verifies that the first path
discovery message is correct and valid, it then uses a similar approach to the
path discovery process to transfer the official data. The sender provides the
official data to the mobile agent including the information about all
intermediate nodes along the established route to the receiver. The official
data is encrypted by the session keys provided by the intermediate nodes. Each
intermediate node just decrypts the message using its session key and then
forwards it to the next node according to the ID of the next node provided by EDA
until it reaches the destined receiver.
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(1) Check if the new arrived message
has already been
received based on the unique
identifier MESSAGE_ID.
If the message was received
previously, drop it silently
and stop; otherwise, continue.
(2) Check if the node satisfies the
required trust value.
(3) Provide its ID to the path
discovery message, so that the agent EDA can check if the node is the
destined receiver.
(4) If the node is NOT the intended
receiver, then
(a) The agent EDA will
generate a secret key Ki to encrypt the following information and
append to the message: the identifier of the intermediate node IDi, a
session key SKi generated by this node and the signature of the
original received message. The key Ki will be stored in EDA so
that it can be retrieved by the source or destination node to decrypt this
corresponding information.
(b) Ask the node to forward the new
message to its neighbors whose trust values meet the source node’s trust
requirement.
(5) If the node is the destined receiver
R, then
(a) EDA hands over the
autonomy to the receiver.
(b) The receiver implements its corresponding
operations and triggers the path reverse phase.
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Figure 1/path Discovery phase
Algorithm.
Mobile Agent
The goal of mobile agent applied in our protocol is to protect
the privacy of the communicating parties. Here, the mobile agent called
Encryption and Decryption Agent (EDA) has two functions: (1) judge the
intended destination; (2) generate different keys to encrypt the intermediate node’s
ID and other information. The agent is generated by the source node, and only
the source and destination nodes are authorized to manage this agent after
authentication. That is, all intermediate nodes cannot encrypt and decrypt any
information through this agent. The advantage of mobile agent is that the
autonomy of encryption is controlled by mobile agent, instead of intermediate
nodes. Therefore, it is not necessary to trust each cooperating node; if one or
more nodes are compromised, anonymous communication can still be achieved.
Path Reverse Phase
When the intended receiver R gets the path discovery
message, it will implement its corresponding operations to retrieve the
information about all intermediate nodes and compose the path reverse message,
as shown in Figure 2.
When the source node S receives the path reverse message, it
decrypts the two sets of encrypted information about the intermediate nodes
respectively from the path discovery phase and the path reverse phase through EDA.
After the source node obtains all IDs about the intermediate nodes, it will
apply TIP mechanism to verify them. Thus, the source node can compare if
these identifiers provided by the intermediate nodes are consistent and
correct. If there is any malicious node providing incorrect or false identifier
during the route establishment process, such invalid route will not be accepted
by our TIP mechanism. Then the source node S passes the
information about all the intermediate nodes (i.e., the route) to the higher application.
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(1) Decrypt the IDs of all
intermediate nodes, compose a
message that contains all these IDs
along the path to the source node, encrypt the message through the agent EDA,
and then send the path reverse message back.
(2) Check if the new arrived node is
along the reverse path to the source node. If not, drop this message silently
and stop; otherwise, continue.
(3) Provide its ID to the path
reverse message, so that the
agent EDA can check if the
node is the source node.
(4) If the node is NOT the intended
source node, then
(a) The agent EDA will
generate a secret key Ki’ to encrypt the identifier of the
intermediate node Idi again and append to the message.
(b) Ask the node to forward the new
message to the next node on the reverse path.
(5) If the node is the destined
source node S, then
(a) EDA hands over the
autonomy to the source node.
(b) The source node applies the TIP
mechanism and
implements its corresponding
operations.
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Figure
2. Path Reverse Phase Algorithm
Mobility of Nodes
(capable when network breaks)
It is indispensable for routing protocols to take the mobility
of nodes into account. After the route has been established, the mobility of
nodes often disrupts the existing information exchange. In order to
continuously communicate along the path, in our protocol we utilize the same
mechanism of route maintenance as DSR and it is unnecessary to issue periodic routing
updates to check for changes in the route status. When the data link is broken
at a node because of the mobility of nodes or other reasons, this node will
send a route error message to the source node of the route. Once the route
error message is received by those nodes that detected this error node, they
will remove the node in error from their route cache, and all routes through
this node should be truncated there. A new route discovery request might be
triggered later.
V.
PROOF
OF CORRECTNESS
The proposed ARMA protocol owns many different characteristics
when compared to other conventional protocols.
In this section, we will provide the
proof of correctness of our ARMA protocol.
Theorem 1. ARMA is secured against passive and active attacks.
Proof.
1. ARMA provides protection against passive
attacks. This is proved based on the path discovery phase and the path reverse phase.
During the two-way conversations, all identifiers IDi of the
intermediate nodes as well as the identifier IDS of the source node and
the identifier IDR of the intended receiver, are encrypted by either the
public key PKS of the sender or the secret keys respectively generated
by the mobile agent EDA. The session keys and other information provided
by the intermediate nodes are also encrypted in the same approach. Since only
the source and destination nodes can access EDA, the passive attacks can be prevented
effectively. Thus, an adversary cannot learn anything information about the
real sender, receiver, and all intermediate nodes, even if it obtains the path
discovery message or the path reverse message.
2. ARMA provides protection against
active attacks. As the mobile agent technique is applied in our protocol, the
source node embeds its identifier and the encryption function into EDA,
Thus, the modification attacks cannot occur even if the malicious nodes obtain
the path discovery message. In addition, the secret key generated by the agent EDA
can protect the path discovery message against replay attacks. Given that
some adversaries want to impersonate the sender or some intermediate nodes, the
receiver can easily find out by EDA that prevents not only malicious
modification, but also impersonation or other kinds of active attacks.
Theorem 3. ARMA guarantees the anonymity of the sender and receiver.
Proof.
1. During the path discovery phase: If a malicious node receives the path
discovery message and only forwards it to its malicious neighbors, the path
might include more malicious nodes after the first one. However, even if this
case happens, our protocol can still achieve anonymity, because the information
of communicating parities isencapsulated in the corresponding mobile agent,
even if the path discovery request will never be sent to the intended receiver
under such circumstances. The malicious nodes that obtain the mobile agent
still cannot access the agent and decrypt the secret information, as only the
source and destination nodes can be authenticated by EDA to access the
agent.
If a series of nodes is
compromised and the nodes can collude with each other, they would not know
where the message came from and where the message was forwarded, because the
destination information always was encrypted by EDA, and particularly, EDA
will judge and decide if the destination arrives or not. In addition, the route
reverse phase also helps to prevent node collusion attacks as the route reply
mechanism means that the receiver has received the route discovery request.
2. during the path reverse phase: If a
malicious node receives the path reverse message, the mobile agent EDA will
protect the anonymous information as such information is encrypted and included
in EDA. The same situation can happen like the above path discovery
phase. If a series of nodes is
compromised and the nodes can collude with each other, EDA still can
guarantee the anonymity as EDA will judge and decide if the destination
is reached or not.
Theorem 4. ARMA guarantees the anonymity of the message content.
Proof. ARMA can
achieve the anonymity for the content of the message, as the message is
encrypted and contained in EDA so that malicious nodes cannot retrieve
the hiding information when they obtain the path discovery or path reverse
message.
Theorem 5. ARMA has the capability of identifying malicious nodes and
establishing routes without them.
Proof. The features
of wireless ad hoc network and their bidirectional links among wireless nodes
determine that the wireless nodes can monitor the behaviours of their neighbouring
nodes. The malicious behaviours of a node can be found by its neighbours and
the malicious node can be excluded from its neighbouring community accordingly.
Thereby, the neighbouring node can accept the path discovery message but avoid
the misbehaving nodes through the trust management systems.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Anonymity is one of the most
challenging issues in wireless and mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we
have presented a novel secure and anonymous routing protocol for wireless ad hoc
networks. Our protocol employs the technique of mobile agent to dynamically discover
routes without the necessity of requiring the intermediate nodes to operate the
route discovery message. The identities of the sender and the receiver as well
as the topology of the network are anonymous. In our approach, our protocol can
prevent malicious nodes compromising the communication through collusion, and
the agent obtains the autonomy of the encryption to improve the security.
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